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Abstract 
The Five Safes framework is increasingly widely used for data governance. Since its conception in 
2003, it has influenced data management in many ways, particularly in the public sector. As it has 
become established, both the advantages and limitations have come to the fore, along with an 
understanding of modern data management principles. 
This paper explores the history, strengths and limitations in the Five Safes, as well as recent 
suggestions for deepening or extending the framework. It places the Five Safes in the context of 
contemporary developments in principles-based design, user-centred planning, and the evidence-
based decision-making. It discusses the different variations on the framework over time, and 
questions whether there is a need for a fundamental rethink.  
The paper argues that the framework works best when aligned simultaneously to an accreditation 
process, a principles-based design ethos, an evidence-base, and a user-centred decision-making 
process. It examines two countries, the UK and Australia, which are moving in this direction but 
through very different routes.  
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1. Introduction 
At the beginning of 2003, the board of the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) was presented with 
a proposal to set up a virtual research data centre (RDC) to allow academic researchers the 
opportunity to analyse sensitive microdata under controlled conditions. Accompanying this proposal 
was a framework that divided confidentiality management into four dimensions: safe projects, safe 
people, safe settings and safe output. Later on, with the addition of ‘safe data’, this framework 
became known as the Five Safes. The Five Safes is widely adopted by organisations across the world, 
particularly National Statistical Institutes (NSIs) in countries as diverse as Australia, Mexico, Norway 
and New Zealand. 
Over time, both the advantages and limitations of the Five Safes framework have become clearer. 
The advantage of the framework is its generalisability: it can be applied to any data management 
problem, such as; designing internal administrative systems, setting up secure onsite facilities or 
releasing information on the internet. However, this advantage is also its main disadvantage: it is a 
framework for thinking, but does not explicitly state a solution. Furthermore the Five Safes has also 
been challenged as being too restrictive due to only having 5 components. Some researchers (eg 
Ritchie and Tava, 2020) have suggested that some dimensions should be prioritised over the rest; 
other researchers have suggested as many as ten dimensions are now necessary (Oppermann, 
2018). There is even confusion over scope: is it a framework for data governance, or a checklist for 
practical data management? This ambiguity has resulted in a variation in both practice and 
implementation of the frameworks.  
The last twenty years has been witness to a number of other developments in confidential data 
management. Some are technical developments, such as differential privacy or synthetic data; some 
are conceptual developments such as the attitudinal model encapsulated in the ‘EDRU’ (evidence-
based, default-open, risk-managed, user-centred) approach first formalised in DSS (2016). However, 
perhaps the most important change has been the growth in the principles-based approach to data 
management. A principles based approach suits the ever changing context of the digital world, and 
provides a basis for policy and legislation, for example in the UK Digital Economy Act 2017 (UKDEA) 
and the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This allows research to continue and 
advance alongside digital advancements; there is less need to revise legislation in the light of 
changing circumstances as implementations can evolve without breaching core principles.  
The alliance between the Five Safes and the principles-based approach has been taken furthest in 
Australia, where the federal government is implementing the ‘Five Data Sharing Principles’ which 
combines both concepts. This ambitious proposal for the whole of the commonwealth government 
has been accompanied with an extensive consultation with data users, data producers and the 
public, and has generated significant debate in Australia and abroad. 
At the same time, some earlier approaches to data management have reappeared; in particular, the 
data-centric approach and a quest for spurious objectivity. Now therefore seems an apposite time to 
review the history and development of the Five Safes and related topics. 
The next section introduces the Five Safes and related concepts. Section 3 considers the limitations 
of the concepts and whether new developments enhance or disrupt the framework. Section 4 
considers the principles-based approach in detail and the role of accreditation. Section 5 details 
examples of the synthetic approach in Australia, the UK and Canada. Section 6 concludes. 
For clarity, we shall use ‘data access’ to cover the whole range of ways that data is being used, and 
‘the access system’ to refer to particular implementations. Examples of access systems could be: 
• Allowing one’s own analysts or third party researchers to produce statistical results from 
confidential data 
• Generating and releasing an anonymised data file for unrestricted use 
• Creating files to be shared under licence 
• Government departments sharing administrative data for policy analysis 
• A private company sharing customer data with suppliers for operations or marketing 
Whilst some authors (eg Arbuckle, 2020) have applied the Fives Safes to private sector contracting 
and data management, we focus here on the public sector. We will also focus on research use such 
as producing statistical analyses, as operational use (eg designing HR systems) presents some 
different challenges.  
Given differences in terminology across different countries, in this paper we use these terms: 
• Microdata: individual records 
• Aggregate statistics: statistical results which cannot be traced to a source respondent 
• Identified data: microdata with direct identifiers such as name, full address, social security 
numbers, health service numbers, and so on 
• De-identified data: microdata with direct identifiers removed but which would reasonably 
allow sources to be identified if data use were unregulated 
• Anonymised data: microdata with no reasonable risk of source re-identification even in 
unrestricted use 
• Data subject: the individual about whom data was collected, whether from surveys or 
operational/administrative sources 
2. The Five Safes 
2.1 Concept and history 
Data access is a complex issue, involving question of law, ethics, IT, statistics, contracts, HR, 
accreditation, and so on. The Five Safes splits data access questions into five elements or dimensions 
of control: 
Element Typical question Example of problems being addressed 
Safe 
projects 
Is this appropriate use and 
management of the data? 
What is the purpose of the access request? 
Is this an ethical and lawful use of the data? 
What is the benefit to society or to the 
organisations sharing data? 
Is there a data management plan in place? 
What happens to the data at the end of the 
project? 
Safe 
people 
How much can I trust the data 
users to use it appropriately? 
Does the users have the necessary technical 
skills? 
Do the users need training in handling 
confidential data? 
Are users likely to follow procedures? 
Safe 
settings 
How much protection does the 
physical environment afford to the 
data? 
How is data stored?  
Are there physical restrictions on the users? 
Does the IT prevent unauthorised use? 
Are mistakes by authorised users likely to be 
detected? 
Safe 
outputs 
How much risk is there in the 
outputs of the access breaching 
confidentiality? 
If the aim of access is to produce statistics, is 
there any residual risk by for example, 
highlighting outliers? 
If the aim of the access is to produce data for 
onward transmission, how do we make sure 
that the data is appropriate? 
Safe data Is the level of detail in the data 
appropriate? 
Is there sufficient detail to allow the project to 
go ahead? 
Is this excessive detail which is not necessary 
for the project? 
 
These are separate but joint elements of any solution; see Ritchie (2017). In each element, there is a 
wealth of knowledge about how to achieve the goals (eg how to run ethics committees, or how to 
anonymise data, how to design IT systems). Therefore each element can be considered separately, 
taking the others as solved problem. For example, a system designer can make decisions on the 
project element on the assumption that user training, IT, data detail and output checks can be 
implemented to any relevant standard. The security and efficiency of the overall solution depends 
on how the components work together but this joint-but-several approach greatly simplifies 
decision-making. 
This joint-but-several approach makes clear that the overall objective of ‘safe use’ might have 
multiple solutions – and also that the effectiveness of control efforts needed to be assessed against 
the risk being managed. For example, Ritchie (2019) argues that restricting the type of output 
allowable in a remote job system, because of a fear of researcher misbehaviour, is aiming at the 
wrong target. The output is not the problem; the researcher training is. 
In general, the Five Safes is focused on risk-reduction: what risk factors have been identified, and will 
such an intervention/control meaningfully reduce that risk? However, the framework can also help 
to identify the need for administrative processes, and the coherence (or not) of those. This indirectly 
can reduce risk, as poorly designed procedures are themselves a risk factor. 
There is a question of terminology. Describing these as five ‘elements’ tends to work well for 
designers and implementers, as it implies a self-contained component which can be tackled as part 
of a project plan. However, in discussions with data holders and the general public, who tend to be 
more concerned that risk is being managed, ‘dimensions of control’ seems to be a more meaningful 
description; this carries the sense of “what can’t you control, and what can you?”. 
Other writers have described the elements as themes, security controls, components, or standards. 
The Mexican Statistical office (Volkow, 2019) uses five “secure elements”, as does OECD (2012). 
Some organisations (eg the NORC Data Enclave in the US, the German federal statistical office) 
describe their operations in terms of a ‘portfolio approach’. 
These five dimensions of control are scales, not targets; different solutions will have different levels 
of control in different dimensions.  Treating controls as scales demonstrate one of the most useful 
aspects of the Framework – the ability to dial up or down controls based on context and how the 
safes are considered jointly. Each control should be effective and contribute to reducing risk, 
therefore limiting unnecessary risk control efforts. In addition, there may be non-existent controls in 
some dimensions, so long as the collective solution is appropriate. For example, contrast the 
controls used when releasing open data on the internet, when downloading end-user licence (EUL) 
files from the UK Data Archive, or when using a secure research data centre (RDC) such as those run 
by most OECD statistical agencies: 
Situation Controls 
 Project People Settings Outputs Data 
Open data None None None None Very high 
(full anonymization) 
EUL 
download 
Some 
(online application) 
Some 
(licence) 
Some 
(online guidance) 
None 
 
High 
(eg little geographical 
detail) 
RDC use High 
(application with 
human review) 
High  
(compulsory 
training) 
High  
(isolated 
environment) 
High  
(all outputs manually 
reviewed) 
Minimal 
(de-identification 
only) 
 
Originally, there were just four ‘safes’ (project, people, setting and output) as this was designed 
specifically for the ONS RDC, and then applied in similar facilities in other countries. This four-safes 
model was adopted in 2005 by the NORC/NIST Data Enclave, which is why US models often only 
have these four. The fifth safe, data, was added by 2008 to allow the framework to describe the 
whole range of ONS statistical outputs, including open data. 
The framework was initially known as the ‘ONS security model’ or ‘VML security model’ after ONS’ 
secure research facility. Around 2012, the name was replaced with the more generic ‘Five Safes’ 
following a suggestion from Statistics New Zealand. However, the use of ‘safe’ has proved 
problematic. Particularly in the early 2010s, organisations began interpreting the framework to 
mean that a ‘safe’ solution must be ‘safe’ in every dimension, in the ordinary sense of the word 
‘safe’. Desai et al (2015) try to correct these errors, and in general the framework is now 
appropriately referenced by data professionals. However, the language is still problematic for non-
specialist audiences, which is one reason why the Australian government adopted the phrase “Five 
data sharing principles” instead of “Five Safes” in its strategy. 
There is no inherent precedence in the Five Safes. Ritchie (2020) argued that for system design, safe 
projects takes precedence over the other four. In modern data system design using the Five Safes, 
safe data is usually treated as the residual: when you know who needs the data, for what purpose, 
and how they will access it, you can adjust the level of the detail in the data to the access 
arrangements and user need (Ritchie, 2017). However, this is not a rule. There may be cases where, 
for example, the detail in the data is fixed in advance, and the other dimensions must adjust to it. 
Finally, it needs to be recognised the use of the framework itself is no guarantee of good practice. A 
governance plan of “There’s no need for ethics as we know what we’re doing; we’ll only give the 
data to people we trust, who say they’ll look after it safely; we don’t need to reduce the data detail, 
as we couldn’t find anyone we know in it, so there’s certainly no risk in outputs…” is certainly using 
the Five Safes, but not necessarily to good effect.  
2.2 Use 
The Five Safes was created to describe data management systems, particularly RDCs. It is currently 
used to describe the governance arrangements for all the general-purpose UK government and 
academic RDCs (ONS, HM Revenue and Customs, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 
Scottish Centre for Administrative Data Research, and the UK Data Archive). Eurostat, the German 
central bank, the Dutch research infrastructure ODISSEI, and the NSIs of Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, Mexico, Norway describe their RDCs in this way.  
Over time, its application has moved away from RDCs to encompass all aspects of data governance. 
For example, it has been used to cover primary data collection in Nepal (nirc.org.np), anonymization 
of health data for sharing (HIPAA, 2017), design of scientific-use files (Hafner et al, 2019) and 
interoperability of standards between organisations (OECD, 2012; Ritchie, 2013). As NSIs often have 
a strong influence over the data strategies of other parts of the public sector, the adoption of the 
Five Safes by NSIs has had significant spillover effects, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries; 
although as found by OSR (2019), organisational commitments to the concept can vary. 
The Five Safes framework has three main uses: description, including pedagogy; design and 
evaluation; and regulation. 
In its early days, the Five Safes was applied to existing systems as a way of describing them (eg 
Ritchie, 2008; Corti, 2015; Bujnowska, 2018), even by organisations that do not formally use it in 
their internal models. The growing familiarity with the model provides a handy short-cut for 
conference presenters, and provide a common frame of reference. It has also been used in 
confidential data management training since 2004 (Eurostat, 2016; Green et al, 2017; ONS, 2020); 
the ready-made structure appeals to the trainees, and the framework provide a context for the 
training itself as part of the ‘safe people’ element. 
 In the last ten years awareness of the Five Safes has preceded planning, and so it has become more 
common to use it for designing data strategies (eg OECD, 2012; DSS, 2016: ICON, 2016; OSR, 2018; 
Cranswick et al, 2019; DfE, 2020). Private sector organisations advising on data strategies have also 
begun to use the five safes (eg Security Brief, 2019; Arbuckle, 2020). The predefined structure can 
simplify evaluation, particularly in cases where the system being evaluated was designed using the 
Five Safes (eg the risk assessment of the UK Data Archive RDC; ONS, 2011) but not exclusively (eg 
ICON, 2016). 
The Five Safes is used in formal legislation, such as the UK Digital Economy Act 2017 or the state 
legislation in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia (DPMC, 2019). With the growth in 
principles-based regulation (see below), the Five Safes has become a useful standard for 
organisations to demonstrate compliance. In the UK, for example, the ONS Regulation bases its 
guidance on the Five Safes (OSR, 2018), while key academic funders (Administrative data Research 
UK, Health Data Research UK, The Innovation Hub), all require bidders to ‘address’ the Five Safes in 
their data management plans. 
2.3 Related developments 
Two important developments in data access have been the EDRU model and the principles-based 
approach. 
Evidence-based, default open, risk-managed, user-centred (EDRU) data planning 
As Ritchie (2014) notes there are strong incentives in the public sector, to take a highly risk-averse 
approach to decisions around confidential data.  This can encourage defensive planning across the 
five safes, most obviously when considering ‘safe data’. 
Statistical disclosure control (SDC) can be applied to microdata to reduce the identifiability of the 
data itself, including the production of anonymised datasets (‘input SDC’). SDC is also applied to 
statistical aggregate to reduce the risk that a statistical finding may inadvertently reveal confidential 
information (‘output SDC’). 
Input SDC is a well established field of research stretching back to the 1970s. It has a coherent 
methodological framework, a large range of statistical techniques, open source software to support 
data holders, and general agreement on the advantages and disadvantages of various solutions.   
However, Hafner et al (2015) and Hafner et al (2019) argue that the application of input SDC in real 
situations over-protects the data and undermines public benefit due to  
• A data-centred perspective which assesses inherent data risk in isolation from its use 
• The use of hypotheticals and mathematically tractable ‘worst case’ models rather than 
evidence in the assessment of risk 
• A ‘default-closed’ position, placing the onus on the data holder to consider whether all 
possible risks have been addressed 
• Use of arbitrary statistical models to generate spurious objectivity 
Similar concerns can be raised about historical attitudes to the other five safes. Often stemming 
from an assumption that data users are inherently untrustworthy and require active policing. these 
reflected the incentives for defensive decision-making in the public sector (Bhatta, 2003; Lofstedt, 
2004; Yang and Holzer, 2011; Ritchie 2014). 
The EDRU model (Hafner et al, 2015; DSS, 2016) proposes an alternative conceptual framework, 
reversing many of the implicit assumptions used in decision-making. The elements are: 
• Evidence-based: use of empirical (rather than modelled) evidence and plausible scenarios 
for risk assessment, and acknowledging uncertainty 
• Default-open: intending to share data unless negative factors cannot be overcome 
• Risk managed: considering risk as a spectrum; including benefits foregone by not sharing; 
acknowledging trade-offs made 
• User-centred: identifying user needs as the primary objective and working backwards 
This approach emphasises decision-making focused on achieving the goal of data access: “how do 
we make X happen?” This contrasts with the historical, defensive approach which is perhaps 
characterised by “Should we make X happen?” 
The EDRU approach is a relatively recent attempt to conceptualise and integrate coherently a 
number of underlying themes in this area, such as ‘safe statistics’ (Ritchie, 2008), ‘active researcher 
management’ (Desai and Ritchie, 2009), ‘circles of trust’ (OECD, 2013) or user-centred training 
(Brandt et al, 2010). As such, it is difficult to say whether organisations have adopted this approach 
or are merely selecting useful elements from it. DSS (2016) is an exception where the organisational 
data strategy was explicitly designed using EDRU motifs. 
In private sector organisations, it is not clear whether the ‘defensive’ approach dominates, or 
whether organisations are active and focused on the ‘how’. This is an area for further research. 
Principles-based models of data planning 
The principles-based approach to data management derived from discontent at rules-based 
regulation which was the dominant approach until recently. 
The rules-based model of regulation aims to specify in a binary manner what is allowed or not 
allowed. Under this model, the primary source of direction is the regulation itself. The principles-
based approach instead focuses on what any system is trying to achieve, and then questions 
whether the system actually achieves those objectives. In a principles-based system, implementation 
decisions are primarily under the control of the implementor; regulation is there to specify the goals, 
and to identify what evidence should be presented that the goals have been achieved. 
Consider the example of tax regulation. A rules-based system would try to identify and specify all the 
allowable tax breaks that can be charged against income. This is clear, but can encourage firms to 
spend unproductive time searching for loopholes, and requires the regulator to spend unproductive 
time seeking to close holes; and it assumes that the tax regulator can adequately specify the 
exceptions. A principles-based tax system could have a general rule along the lines of “only expenses 
relating to the trading activity are chargeable”, and then evaluate using expert opinion when tax 
returns are submitted. Clearly the second case is much more complicated; there is negligible value to 
finding loopholes in the law, but more incentive to misrepresent activities. The success of it depends 
very much on how the regulator communicates with firms, and the reputation of the regulator. 
In the context of the Five Safes, the two may be contrasted using the following examples, which all 
exist somewhere: 
Safe… Rules-based Principles-based 
Projects Identify list of valid uses Specify benefits  that must be demonstrated, 
and risks to be considered 
People Require specific accreditation eg meet 
Civil Service appointments criteria 
Require ‘appropriate’ training 
Setting Follow government IT standard Follow ISO27001 practices (ie choose system 
and be able to demonstrate integrity of it) 
Output Apply threshold rule tabular statistics Apply threshold rules but allow appeals if 
important and demonstrably non-disclosive 
Data Clear boundary between anonymised 
and other data 
Data must be ‘appropriate’ to the 
environment  
 
The Five Safes therefore can accommodate either approach, or a mixture of the two. Older data 
management solutions tend to be rules-based and may or may not use the Five Safes. The moves 
towards principles-based models are more likely to be done in the context of the Five Safes.  
3. Developing the Five Safes 
3.1 Should there be more safes, or more sub-safes? 
As noted above, the Five Safes is a generic framework.  Some authors have tried to give more 
meaning to the dimensions. For example, Ritchie (2013), when considering how international data-
sharing standards might be developed, suggested breaking down ‘safe people’ into ‘knowledge’ and 
‘incentives’, and ‘safe setting’ into ‘access’ and ‘networks’. Statistics Canada breaks the ‘safe people’ 
component into organisational and personal criteria, so that this component is itself multi-
dimensional. 
The element that has grown most in scope since 2003 is ‘safe projects’. Initially there to cover the 
process of getting approval to ONS’ secure facility, it now is seen to cover all the project planning 
aspects: ethical approval, data management plans, benefit/cost assessment and user identification. 
As Ritchie (2020) notes, when designing data management from scratch this element takes centre 
stage. This has also been the focus of much of the Australian consultation, particularly the onward 
use of data from data access requests.  
‘Safe outputs’ has also changed. Originally concerned with the production of statistical outputs by 
researchers, different applications of the Five Safes has means that this has described user queries 
to an HR system, datasets for onward management, or products to support compliance strategies.  
The Five Safes website lists a number of sub-fields within each of the dimensions as a way of 
breaking complex data management/evaluation problems down. It also provides a list of questions 
or challenges for designers. 
However, there have been some proposals to increase the number of dimensions. For example, ACS 
(2019) suggests: 
• Safe organisations – ensuring the organisation has in place and follows agreed procedures 
• Safe lifecycle – time-relevant issues such as archiving and the sensitivity over time 
• Safe outcomes – the ultimate uses of the project output 
• Safe use – the impact of using the project output, apparently in a moral/ethical context 
• Safe response – dealing with accidents 
While these are all important subjects, it is not at all clear that the extra ‘safes’ help data planning. 
The safe projects/outputs/outcomes/use overlap underlies the difficulties – as more dimensions are 
added, the distinctions between the dimensions become weaker, and it is not clear what question is 
being addressed and how each dimension can be considered separately.  
Ironically, it can also create unhelpful distinctions. For example, most organisations consider the safe 
organisations/safe people argument as part of the same question – what skills, training or 
assurances are needed to ensure that the users act appropriately? For bodies which explicitly 
consider organisations as part of the solution (such as Statistics Canada or Eurostat), separating 
organisation from person makes no sense. Excessive subdivision may also lead to micromanagement 
and turf wars, outcomes the Five Safes was originally designed to avoid. 
This is not to say that raising these issues is unhelpful in terms of thinking about data access. For 
example, ‘safe response’ emphasises that a well-run organisations would have processes in place to 
identify, manage and communicate breaches of data security. It is not clear why it is helpful to think 
of this separately from the other dimensions. People and IT planning normally includes a breach 
policy, and part of a cost-benefit or privacy impact assessments should include the risk of failure and 
mitigation. However, it could be argued that this is necessary to make organisations explicitly 
confront the issue. Addressing these issues is one reason why the Australian Government included 
advice on what to do before and after applying the Five Data Sharing Principles in its Guidance. 
Perhaps the reason why these struggle to make the case for new ‘safes’ is that the additional 
measure are about implementation rather than concepts or themes. Claiming that a designed 
system is ‘safe’ because safe projects, people and setting have been considered assumes that project 
planning, people training and robust system design are done competently. There is of course nothing 
in the Five Safes or the extended scheme to guarantee this.  In contrast, the extensions to ‘safe 
people’ being trialled in Canada, for example, does not add new concepts, but refines them.  
Nevertheless, the ACS’s detailed critique of the Five Safes should be welcomed for challenging 
assumptions, precisely because they can be accommodated in the current framework. One 
particular problem they highlight is of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Should a new ‘safe’ be 
created for them? Perhaps in the future there will be a new dimension for autonomous systems, but 
the current debate, whether AI fits into the ‘people’, ‘settings’ or ‘output’ category, is stimulating 
much debate precisely because trying to fit AI into an existing category forces us to confront our 
understanding.    
3.2 Should the five safes be more objective? 
The Five Safes is an explicitly subjective framework. It does not attempt to quantify ‘safe’ in any 
dimension, let alone try to balance ‘safety’ in one dimension against ‘safety’ in another dimension. 
There are five reasons for this.  
First, there is no meaningful metric in any dimension, let alone a common metric. Consider defining 
a metric for ‘safe projects’. There could be a case for a cost-benefit analysis of the value to the 
public: lives saved as a result of a data linking project versus implementation cost and expected cost 
arising from an unknown breach. Most of these costs and benefits are unknowable and not 
measurable. This is why cost-efficiency analysis is more often used to assess the worth of a project, 
but, by design, they do not question whether the project itself brings an acceptable risk or not. 
It could be argued that the common measure across all dimensions is “what is the risk of re-
identification?” This is often the proposed measure (assuming it could be measured) but is not the 
only one. Re-identification risk can almost always be substantially reduced by expenditure in one or 
more dimensions, and so this risk alone is not a measure.  
The second issue is that discussion of ‘trade-offs’, ‘risk-utility maps’ or similar concepts implicitly 
assumes the independence of protection measures. Assume, for expository purposes, that people 
and setting are the only relevant dimensions. The trade-off argument assumes these are 
independent and linked by some function f to create safe use: 
safe use = f(people, setting) 
However, what if in reality the risk of re-identification for each depends on the value of the other: 
safe use = f(people│setting, setting│people) 
For example, the likelihood of an individual making a mistake might be dependent on the IT system; 
the effectiveness of IT controls might depend on training for the user. This is no longer a linear 
trade-off, but a complex non-linear model – again, with unknown values in every place. 
Third, trade off models do not allow for discontinuities. A secure RDC presents qualitatively different 
risk to an end user licence model, and both will be differently affected by an ethical approval 
process. This topic is characterised by discontinuities across all the different potential activities. 
Fourth, any data that does come out of modelling is subjective. Consider the most objective measure 
in this whole field: assessing the disclosure risk in a given dataset. There is a large literature on this, 
going back to the 1970s. Techniques have been developed for many types of data, statistics and 
attack models. There are software tools, such as µArgus/τArgus or sdcTable/sdcMicro, to calculate 
risk probabilities to many decimal points, and which are invaluable for exploring the relative risk in 
data and tabular outputs. Overall, there is a large and stable body of literature on the relative pros 
and cons of all the different statistical disclosure control (SDC) procedures. 
None of these have any external validity. The disclosure modeller faces choices at every stage of the 
process for which he or she has to make a subjective choice: 
• the attack scenario 
• the attacker’s motivation 
• how much information the attacker already has 
• the time and resources available to the attacker 
• alternative data sources available to the attacker 
• alternative published statistics available to the attacker 
• what similar results will be published in future 
• whether repeated attacks are possible 
And so on. As noted in section 2 above, SDC analysts often discuss ‘worst case scenarios’. The SDC 
literature has developed this concept to a common standard so that the results from analytical 
research articles can be usefully compared and lessons learned about the pros and cons of different 
measures. However, this does not mean that models used for methodological development should 
be applied in practical cases, as the ‘worst case’ may no longer be relevant. Moreover, these models 
are typically the mathematically tractable worst-case scenarios.  They cannot represent events 
which cannot be modelled (spontaneous recognition, for example; Ritchie, 2017) or unknowable 
events (the likelihood of an authorised user selling market-sensitive information). In short, claims to 
objectivity are spurious.  
Consider differential privacy (DP), which has become popular among private sector consultancies 
selling data protection services. DP is claimed to mathematically guarantee a level of uncertainty 
around a statistic, which it does; but only in a very constrained set of circumstances. It is easy to 
demonstrate that it is little better than any other noise addition tool in protecting confidentiality; it 
can also produce nonsensical results except on a very well-defined use case (basically, frequency 
tables with no rare events). It is noticeable the statistical agencies, with the exception of the US 
Census Bureau (Dajani et al, 2017), have largely rejected DP in favour of more user-centred methods 
such as cell-key perturbation. 
Finally, there is the quantum problem: the design of the system affects the interaction of the 
participants in the system. Most obviously, user training and IT systems are designed to affect 
behaviour; but in practice most systems evolve over time in unexpected ways. 
Until ten to fifteen years ago, data access was still dominated by the statistical approach, where 
quantitative risk assessments were given great prominence. This was most noticeable in the 
statistical agencies; as these had positions of authority in national systems, this was the prevailing 
viewpoint in the public sector. However, in the last decade this has increasingly been abandoned in 
favour of the multi-dimensional, explicitly subjective, EDRU approach.  
The choice of whether to quantify/not quantify risk also affects the public debate. Numerous studies 
have shown that public perceptions of whether data sharing is a public benefit are highly sensitive to 
the questions asked (eg Hallinan et al, 2012; Wellcome Trust, 2013; Understanding Patient Data, 
2018). Studies (eg Jenkins et al, 2017) also show that numbers are more likely to be perceived as 
reliable than verbal description, irrespective of their actual credibility. For example, during the 
Covid-19 pandemic, there was substantial public debate about the value of ‘R0’, the base infection 
rate. Public engagement centred on whether this value was greater or less than one. There was 
almost no debate outside scientific circles of confidence intervals, sample bias, distributions or other 
statistical factors which make the simple ‘what is R0?’ question meaningless. 
In this light, the lack of quantitative measures for the Five Safes is not a gap in the literature, but an 
essential strength of the model. It focuses decision-makers’ minds on the need to collect, evaluate 
and use subjective evidence, and to build consensus for decisions. Quantitative models, such as 
those used by SDC professionals, can provide useful supporting evidence, particularly in terms of 
relative risk, but only supporting evidence. 
4. The Five Safes, principles-based planning and accreditation 
In recent years, the Five Safes model has become increasingly associated with the principles-based 
approach to regulation. There is an affinity between the two concepts. The Five Safes provides a 
framework for planning; the principles-based model provides a way of suggesting how goals should 
be specified. Neither is specific on the actual implementation; but both provide a way that the 
effectiveness of any implementation can be measured.   
As noted above, there is no inherent reason for organisations to apply both, but in practice 
principles-based regulation is increasing framed in a Five Safes framework. This is explicit in 
legislation in the UK, and in the forthcoming legislation in Australia. The European GDPR is not 
explicitly principles-based and does not cite the Five Safes. Nevertheless, its balancing of data detail 
against ‘procedural and technical measures’ and the avoidance of specific technical or statistical 
standards in favour of solutions ‘having regard to’ outcomes places it in the same camp. 
The popularity of principles-based regulation is that it seems to address some of the flaws of older 
legislation which struggled to provide adequate guidance. Rules-based regulation works well when 
the terms can be unambiguously defined. For example, the UK Data Protection Act 2018 makes 
(attempted) re-identification of de-identified or anonymous data a criminal act except in very 
specific, unambiguous, easily understood cases. However in general specification of rules in this field 
is difficult. 
Consider, once again, the issue of anonymization. Much of the older legislation distinguishes 
between ‘anonymous’ and identifiable (identified or de-identified) data. While this is helpful in 
setting the limits of legislation (which typically allows data to be unregulated once anonymised), it 
provides little guidance as to how identifiable data should be managed. There are definitional 
problems: ‘anonymised’ is never defined unambiguously, and some laws distinguish between 
‘personal’ and ‘identifiable’ (so that data can be anonymous yet still personal information). In the 
case of data legislation, it is almost certain that technological developments will lead to changes in 
the standard of what is ‘anonymous’ (NSQR, 2019). Most importantly, defining exactly what the 
legislation means in any specific case requires guidelines and, sometimes, legal judgments.  
The principles-based approach aims to sidestep this by being explicit about the need for ambiguity at 
the legislative level, as long as the appropriate checks and balances are available at the 
implementation stage. For example, a principle could be “data which has been fully anonymised 
does not count as ‘personal information’ in the context of this legislation”. This is clear in its 
purpose, and the legislation does not need to define ‘fully anonymised’; additional regulation fills 
the legislative gaps by design. 
A key element of making the principles-based approach work is accreditation. Rather than specifying 
actions, actors, systems and procedures undergo ex ante validation to ensure that they are fit for the 
purpose. An analogy is with driving: while there are rules of the road, the primary mechanisms for 
compliance with the rules is to ensure that drivers are fit; drivers infringing good practice (either by 
breaking explicit rules, or by infringing subjective measures such as ‘dangerous driving’) have their 
accreditation revoked. In many financial markets, good conduct is hard to specify, and so regulators 
rely on the accreditation of practitioners (Keenan, 2020). 
The advantages of the principles-plus-accreditation approach are 
• efficiency, as solutions can be adjusted to circumstance rather than a legislative context 
• flexibility, as multiple accreditation pathways can be set up 
• adaptability to circumstances, rather than requiring legislative/formal change 
• adaptability to collective learning as processes develop 
• cultural change through positive reinforcement and engagement with goals 
• engagement with stakeholders 
The last is a consequence of the problems of the principles-plus-accreditation approach, compared 
to a rules-based regulation model: 
• It may be less clear, at least at first sight 
• There may be concerns about unfair or uneven treatment, and so transparency in processes 
is essential 
• Practitioners might want clear guidelines in advance to implement solutions, rather than 
post-hoc approval 
 
An effective principles-based system therefore requires a much greater level of engagement. 
We consider how this works in practice by studying two national systems, one (UK) which evolved 
over two decades, and one (Australia) currently being created from, relatively speaking, a standing 
start. 
Microdata access at the UK Office for National Statistics 
In 2002, when the Five Safes was conceived, access to the business data at ONS was governed by the 
Statistics of Trade Act 1947. This Act had no conception of data being collected for any other 
purpose than producing aggregate tabulations for measuring the economy. As a result, finding an 
efficient access path which met both the spirit and letter of the Act, required a complex legal 
structure which blocked a number of important potential users, such as PhD students (Ritchie, 
2014).  
In 2007 the Statistics and Registration Services Act created a simple access gateway, the ‘approved 
researcher’, and the basis for a flexible data acquisition and access path. These provisions addressed 
the limitations of the 60-year-old legislation. It did not build a new conceptual model, but this new 
legislation and the growing impact of the Five Safes on ONS data planning led to a culture change 
about how ONS should approach data access issues. 
By the time of the Digital Economy Act 2017 (DEA), the pieces had fallen into place, and the 
legislation served to embody this new model into law. In respect of research data access, the DEA 
used the Five Safes for its structure, set out the principles on which access would be granted, and 
created an accreditation process for each of projects, people, settings and outputs (data is 
effectively the residual, as Ritchie, 2017, recommends). The UK Statistics Authority oversees all the 
accreditation processes.  
The advantages of this approach are best seen in the ‘people’ and setting’ accreditation. There are 
five general-purpose RDCs in the UK holding detailed ONS and other government data. These all 
operate slightly differently (some for example, are only accessible on the premises, some allow 
home remote access in special circumstance). However, the same principles of safe setting apply to 
all. In contrast, there is one accredited researcher training programme (‘Safe Researcher Training, or 
SRT; Green et al , 2017) which all the RDCs use, as well as a number of other services. There is 
nothing to stop another provider setting up an accredited research training programme. However as 
the SRT was designed to cover good practice in a range of settings, there has been no substantial 
demand for local variations.  
In the UK therefore, legislation has largely followed practice. That practice has evolved over some 
twenty years, with many opportunities for learning and correction (and input from other countries), 
and the move to a principles-plus-accreditation system has been uncontroversial. 
Data access in the Australian Federal Government 
Until recently, the Australian federal government took a data-centred default-closed perspective on 
data sharing and access. In 2014, after a critical review by the public auditors, the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS) took the decision to move towards a default-open environment for research 
access, and adopted the Five Safes as the governance framework. Building on the ABS experience, 
other departments followed suit, including the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and the 
Australian Government Department of Social Services. 
In 2016, the Productivity Commission was asked to carry out a root-and-branch review of the 
options for improving the sharing of data across all government. The subsequent report 
(Productivity Commission, 2017) exhaustively researched best practice and new developments 
around the world, and argued for a systemic shift in emphasis towards an EDRU-style principles-
based model using the Five Safes as the structure. In 2018 the Office of the National Data 
Commissioner was set up to implement the recommendations, and began a two-year programme of 
public consultation and legislative drafting for a user-centred principles-plus-accreditation model to 
be applied across the federal government. As the drafting period has progressed, the consultation 
has moved from exploring problems and concerns to developing guidelines to help practitioners 
implement the principles.  
The Australian experience therefore represents a very different development trajectory compared to 
the UK. Notwithstanding the early changes implemented by individual departments such as ABS, this 
is a clear break with past traditions. This has necessitated the extensive consultation period, as an 
entire culture change is being proposed. This is a substantial leap beyond current practices in other 
countries, and so presents more of a risk than a piecemeal approach. However, none of the 
individual elements being introduced is unknown in the rest of the world, and the whole-of-
government approach provides a unique opportunity to build in consistency and shared 
understanding of principles from the beginning. At the time of writing (June 2020) this process is 
only partially complete, but it seems likely that the Australian experience will provide valuable 
lessons for many other countries. 
5. Conclusion 
The Five Safes model has become well-established, not through diktat but because it offers a useful 
structure for addressing data access, management and governance. It is increasingly the design 
structure for statistical organisations and RDCs, and has prompted the development of useful 
practices such as output statistical disclosure control and active researcher management. 
It remains an empty structure, by design. The usefulness and applicability of the concept is because 
it helps to order discussions, design, evaluation, regulation, but makes no specific requirement on 
any of these. Using the Five Safes to design a data governance plan is no guarantee of competent 
delivery, any more than ignoring the Five Safes is a certain recipe for failure. 
The Five Safes is explicitly subjective and qualitative, again by design. While some recent proposals 
to develop quantitative measures of risk are no doubt well-intentioned, the lesson of the last twenty 
years is that spurious metrics limit genuine risk assessment, lower credibility, and reduce the 
opportunity to extract public value from data sharing and use. Subjective decision-making, properly 
implemented, provides consistency and transparency but with the capability of responding to 
individual circumstances.  
There have also been proposals to extend the range of the Five Safes; Statistics Canada, for example, 
has spent much time rethinking how ‘safe people’ can be expressed as the interaction of the 
personal and the organisational responsibility. Others have suggested having more ‘safes’ but at the 
moment it is not clear that the gain in coverage outweighs the increase in complexity. 
What has become apparent in the last decade, as the number of users of the Five Safes increases, is 
that there is a need for more detail. Many organisations have developed their own guidelines or 
interpretations; perhaps the next stage in the evolution of the Five Safes will be common 
understanding the ten or twenty or however-many ‘Sub-Safes’. The scale of the Australian federal 
government project is likely to become a benchmark in this regard. 
Finally, we note that the Five Safes did not develop in a vacuum, and continues to interact with other 
concepts. The evidence-based, default-open, risk-managed, user-centred attitudinal (EDRU) 
approach aligns well with the Five Safes as it has the same perspective on the importance of 
subjective, evidence-based decision–making. But the biggest change in the next decade is likely to be 
the growth in principles-based data regulation, where the Five Safes provides a natural structure for 
the accreditation processes essential for effective principles-based operation. 
References 
DSS (2016) Data Access Project: Final Report. Australian Government Department of Social Services. 
June.   
Arbuckle L.  and El Emam K. (2020) Building an anonymization pipeline. O’Reilly Publishers 
Bhatta G. (2003) “Don't just do something, stand there! Revisiting the issue of risks in innovation in 
the public sector”. The Innovation Journal 
Brandt M., Franconi L., Guerke C., Hundepool A., Lucarelli M., Mol J., Ritchie F., Seri G. and Welpton 
R. (2010), Guidelines for the checking of output based on microdata research, Final report of 
ESSnet sub-group on output SDC 
Bujnowska A. (2018) Access to European Microdata for Statistical Purposes. 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cros/system/files/04.access_to_microdata.pdf  
 CESSDA (2017) CESSDA Strengthening and Widening. Confedaration of European Social Science Data 
Archives, Deliverable D3.5. October. 
Corti L., van den Eyden V, Bishop L. and Wollard M. (2020) Managing and Sharing Research Data: A 
Guide to Good Practice, 2nd edition. Sage. 
Cranswick K., Tumpane S. and Stobert S (2019) Virtual data labs - A more flexible approach to access 
Statistics Canada microdata. UNECE/Eurostat Work Session on Statistical Data 
Confidentiality, The Hague, October 
Dajani A. Lauger A., Singer P., Kifer D., Reiter J., Machanavajjhala A., Garfinkel S., Dahl S., Graham M., 
Karwa V., Kim H., Leclerc P., Schmutte I., Sexton W., Vilhuber L., and Abowd J. (2017) The 
modernization of statistical disclosure limitation at the U.S. Census Bureau. UNECE/Eurostats 
Worksession on Statistical Data Confidentiality 2017, Skopje. 
Desai T. and Ritchie F. (2010) "Effective researcher management", in Work session on statistical data 
confidentiality 2009; Eurostat; forthcoming   
Desai T., Ritchie F., and Welpton R. (2016) The Five Safes: designing data access for research. 
Working papers in Economics no. 1601, University of the West of England, Bristol. January  
DfE (2020) How we share pupil and workforce data. Department for Education. 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/data-protection-how-we-collect-and-share-research-data 
DPMC (2019) Data Sharing and Release Legislative Reforms Discussion Paper. Commonwealth of 
Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
Eurostat (2016) Self-study material for the users of Eurostat microdata sets   
Green E., Ritchie F., Newman J. and Parker T. (2017) "Lessons learned in training 'safe users' of 
confidential data". UNECE worksession on Statistical Data Confidentiality 2017. Eurostat.   
Hafner H-P., Lenz R., Ritchie F., and Welpton R. (2015) "Evidence-based, context-sensitive, user-
centred, risk-managed SDC planning: designing data access solutions for scientific use", in 
UNECE/Eurostat Worksession on Statistical Data Confidentiality 2015, Helsinki.   
Hafner, H., Lenz, R. & Ritchie F. (2019). User-focused threat identification for anonymised microdata. 
Statistical Journal of the IAOS, 35(4), 703-713. https://doi.org/10.3233/SJI-190506.   
Hallinan D., Friedewald M. and McCarthy P. (2012) Citizens' perceptions of data protection and 
privacy in Europe. Computer Law & Security Review v28:3 pp263-272 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2012.03.005  
Groves R. and Harris-Kojetin B. (Eds) (2017) Federal Statistics, Multiple Data Sources, and Privacy 
Protection: Next Steps. National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine. 
ICON (2016) Hellenic Statistical Authority Mission on microdata access: final report. Eurostat   
Jenkins S., Harris A., and Lark R. (2017) Maintaining credibility when communicating uncertainty: The 
role of communication format. In: Gunzelmann G., Howes A., Tenbrink T. and Davelaar E. 
(eds.) CogSci 2017: Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. 
(pp. pp. 582-587). Cognitive Science Society: London, UK. Lofstedt R.E. (2004) “The swing of 
the regulatory pendulum i Europe: from precautionary principle to (regulatory) impact 
analysis”. J. Risk and Uncertainty v28:3 pp237-260 
Keenan P. (2020) “Dictum meum pactum”: UK regulation: Rules or Principles. Keenan Regulatory 
Consulting. 
OECD (2014) OECD Expert Group for International Collaboration on microdata Access: Final report. 
Organisation for Ecoomic Co-operation and Development.July. 
ONS (2020) Safe Researcher Training 2017 onwards. Last reviewed June 2020 
Opperman I. (ed.) (2018) Privacy in Data Sharing: a guide for business and government. Australian 
Computer Society. November. 
OSR (2018a) Joining up data for better statsitics. Office for Statistics Regulation Systematic Review 
Programme Report. September 
OSR (2018b) Regulatory guidance – Building confidence in the handling and use of data. Office for 
Statsitcs Regulation. Updated October.  
OSR (2019) Joining up data for better statsitics. Office for Statistics Regulation Systematic Review 
Programme Report. October 
Productivity Commission (2017). Data Availability and Use – Inquiry Report. Australian Productivity 
Commission.  
Ritchie F. (2008) “Secure access to confidential microdata: four years of the Virtual Microdata 
Laboratory” in Economic and Labour Market Review; Office for National Statistics; May, pp 
29-34   
 Ritchie F. (2008) “Secure access to confidential microdata: four years of the Virtual Microdata 
Laboratory” in Economic and Labour Market Review; Office for National Statistics; May, pp 
29-34   
Ritchie F. (2013) "International access to restricted data: A principles-based standards approach". 
Statistical Journal of the IAOS v29:4 pp289-300. DOI 10.3233/SJI-130780   
Ritchie F. (2014) Resistance to change in governments: risk inertia and incentives. UWE Departmetn 
of Economics working paper no.1412. December 
Ritchie F. (2017) The ‘Five Safes’: a framework for planning, designing and evaluating data access 
solutions. Data For Policy Conference 2017. September.  
Ritchie F. (2017) Spontaneous recognition: an unnecessary control on data access? ECB Statistical 
Papers no.24. European Central Bank. August.  
Ritchie F. and Tava F. (2020) Five Safes or One Plus Four Safes? Musing on project purpose. Bristol 
Centre for Economics and finance blog 
Security Brief (2019) IXUP embeds Five Safes framework in platform. 
https://securitybrief.com.au/story/ixup-embeds-five-safes-framework-in-platform 
Understanding Patient Data (2018) Public attitudes to patient data use: A summary of existing 
research. Understanding Patient Data. September  
Volkow N. (2019) Harnessing the potentiality of microdata access risk management model.  
UNECE/Eurostat Work Session on Statistical Data Confidentiality, The Hague, October 
Wellcome Trust (2013) Qualitative Research into Public Attitudes to Personal Data and Linking 
Personal Data. Wellcome Trust, London. July 
Yang K. and Holzer M. (2006) “The Performance–Trust Link: Implications for Performance 
Measurement” Public Administration Review. v66:1 pp114–126 
 
 
